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After the 1989-90 democratic transition, Poland and Hungary were the first to introduce the
institutional framework of constitutional democracy and of transitional justice. For a number
of reasons, including a lack of democratic traditions and constitutional culture, after the
2010 parliamentary elections, liberal constitutionalism became a victim of the authoritarian
efforts of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party. The new constitution, called Fundamental Law,
systematically dismantles guarantees of the rule of law, leading to measures of ‘bad
political justice’ Here I refer to “bad” political justice, using the terminology of Ellen Lutz
and Caitlin Reiger, who citing Judith N. Shklar’s book Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political
Trials (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), distinguish between “bad” political
trials, in which politics gains the upper hand over justice, and “good” political trials, which
reflect a desire for public accountability. See Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger, “Introduction,”
in Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger, eds., Prosecuting Heads of State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 10-11., in which politics wins out over justice through
ordinary national criminal law. Unlike the 1989 Constitution, the 2011 Fundamental Law of
Hungary is rather vocal about the country’s dictatorial past and reveals the intentions of the
new constitution-making majority. The preamble, entitled “National Avowal,” opens with the
statement, “We deny any statute of limitation for the inhuman crimes committed against the
Hungarian nation and its citizens under the national socialist and communist dictatorships”.
If “inhuman crimes” refers to war crimes and crimes against humanity, then the denial of a
statute of limitations complies with effective international law. However, if it refers to less
serious crimes, then the Fundamental Law is in breach of the prohibition on retroactive
effect, emphasized in earlier decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.
At the same time, the new Preamble recognizes only the pre-1944 years of Hungarian
history, not the acts and failures that give cause for self-criticism. It declares that “We date
the restoration of our country’s self-determination, lost on the nineteenth day of March
1944, from the second day of May 1990, when the first freely elected organ of popular
representation was formed”. In so doing, the Constitution fails to acknowledge that war
crimes and crimes against humanity were committed not only by foreign occupying forces
and their agents during World War II, but also between 1920 and 1944 by extreme right-
wing “free troops” and the security forces of the independent Hungarian state, not only
against “the Hungarian nation and its citizens” but also against other peoples. Nor does it
acknowledge that the continuity of Hungary’s statehood was not interrupted: restrictions
were placed on government agencies’ freedom to act, but the government was not shut
down. Miklós Horthy, the Regent of Hungary remained in his office, and Parliament sat
and regularly passed bills introduced by the government, and the Hungarian state
leadership did not declare the termination of legal continuity, but cooperated with the
occupying powers.
In April 2013, the government as part of the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law
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adopted Article U, which supplements detailed provisions on the country’s communist past
and the statute of limitations in the body text of the constitution. This new article, passed
after 23 years of solid democracy and a working system of the rule of law, revisits the
settlements made during the immediate transition from communist dictatorship to
democracy by reopening possible cases against former communist officials. While the law
could potentially serve the aim of accountability, in the only case opened so far (the Biszku
case) Béla Biszku, who played a key role as Minister of Interior between 1957 and 1961 in
the reprisals against the participants of the 1956 revolution was charged with crimes, which
were subject to the statute of limitations. Therefore, the Parliament enacted a law, called in
the media “Lex Biszku”, which translated the definition of crimes against humanity of the
Nuremberg Statute into Hungarian and explicitly authorized the Hungarian courts to
prosecute them, without defining the contextual elements of crimes against humanity and
also criminalizing the violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in
contravention of the nullum crimen principle. Moreover, the law introduced the category of
“communist crimes” and declared that the commission or aiding and abetting of serious
crimes such as voluntary manslaughter, assault, torture, unlawful detention and coercive
interrogation is not subject to a statute of limitations when committed on behalf, with the
consent, or in the interest of the party state. This provision clearly replicates the one that
was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 1992. Based on the new law, Béla
Biszku was the only person convicted for being a member of the interim executive
committee of the communist party which set up a special armed force in order to “maintain
order” and act with force against civilians, if need be. The court acquitted the defendant
regarding the most serious charge, and found him guilty only of complicity and two
unrelated petty crimes: abuse of ammunition and the denial of the crimes of the communist
regime. For these minor crimes, he was sentenced for two years imprisonment, suspended
for three years. The verdict was still not final, because the prosecution appealed for a
heavier judgment, while the defendant asked for total acquittal, but after the verdict was
made public, the defendant died., it in fact represents victors’ justice by weakening the
ruling party Fidesz’s political rival, the Socialist Party (the successor of the Communist
Party).
Article U(1) states that the pre-1989 Communist Party (the Hungarian Socialist Workers’
Party) and its satellite organizations that supported the communist ideology were “criminal
organizations” whose leaders carry a liability that is “without a statute of limitations”. In
sections 7 and 8, however, that broad statement is contradicted by provisions that define a
mechanism for the interruption and tolling of the statute of limitations for communist-period
crimes that had not been prosecuted.
Furthermore, the Fundamental Law includes a very broad and general liability for a number
of past acts, including destroying post-WWII Hungarian democracy with the assistance of
Soviet military power; the unlawful persecution, internment, and execution of political
opponents; the defeat of the 1956 October Revolution; destroying the legal order and
private property; creating national debt; “devastating the value of European civilization”;
and liability for all criminal acts that were committed with political animus and had not been
prosecuted by the criminal justice system for purely political motives.
3)
2/4
Article U(2) and U(3) call for the remembrance of the communist past and create a new
national committee to document national memory in this regard. New Article U(4) provides
that former communist leaders are public persons with respect to their past political actions
and as such must tolerate public scrutiny and criticism, except for deliberate lies and untrue
statements, as well as the disclosure of personal data linked to their functions and actions.
New Article U(5) provides grounds for new legislation that reduces the pensions and other
benefits of specific leaders of the communist dictatorship. This provision appears to
contradict the Constitutional Court decision 43/1995, which held that people could not be
denied pension payments after they had paid, as they were required to do, into the state
pension scheme. But that decision, together with all others made prior to the coming into
force of the Fundamental Law, has been annulled by the Fourth Amendment.
Article U(6) through (8) relate to the tolling and interruption of the statute of limitations for
specific serious crimes that appear not to be time barred by virtue of Article U(1). There is
as of yet no law that defines which crimes are serious enough to justify the removal of all
time limitations on prosecutions and which are subject to the newly reset clock for
prosecutions. These provisions contradict the Constitutional Court’s declaration in its
decision 11/1992 that this sort of extension of the statute of limitations is unconstitutional.
Yet, Article U(9) bars compensating victims of the communist period by ruling out the
passage of any new laws that might provide compensation to individuals for harms caused
to them during the period open to re-examination in light of the adoption of Article U. To
reverse course after 23 years puts those who may be prosecuted long after the fact at a
very distinct disadvantage. More than two decades is a very long period of time after which
to alter the legal framework of the statute of limitations for the types of criminal acts in
question. Such provisions may not run afoul of the time-honored doctrine of nullum crimen
sine lege, but they may nonetheless constitute violations of the right to due process of law.
The sad experience of Hungary’s once pioneer democratic transition is that the initial
measures of transitional justice did not help to reconcile society and consolidate
democracy. Perhaps transitional justice as a substitute idealism for trying to invigorate a
new democratic regime without a strong democratic prehistory was doomed to turn into
political justice without any rule of law guarantees. The current Hungarian government’s
attitude towards public discussion of history, similar to that of the Polish one, reflects the
position of these illiberal populist regimes towards the rights of their citizens. As it is
demonstrated in a recently published excellent collection of essays on memory laws, the
legal governance of history shapes the public understanding of the past in other parts of the
world as well.
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